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Abstract
We study efficient mechanisms for the query release problem in differential privacy: given
a workload of m statistical queries, output approximate answers to the queries while satisfying
the constraints of differential privacy. In particular, we are interested in mechanisms that
optimally adapt to the given workload. Building on the projection mechanism of Nikolov,
Talwar, and Zhang, and using the ideas behind Dudley’s chaining inequality, we propose new
efficient algorithms for the query release problem, and prove that they achieve optimal sample
complexity for the given workload (up to constant factors, in certain parameter regimes) with
respect to the class of mechanisms that satisfy concentrated differential privacy. We also give
variants of our algorithms that satisfy local differential privacy, and prove that they also achieve
optimal sample complexity among all local sequentially interactive private mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
There is an inherent tension in data analysis between privacy and statistical utility. This tension
is captured by the Fundamental Law of Information Recovery: Revealing “overly accurate answers
to too many questions will destroy privacy”.1 This tension, however, is not equally pronounced for
every set of queries an analyst may wish to evaluate on a sensitive dataset. As a simple illustration,
a single query repeatedm times is much easier to answer while preserving privacy than is a collection
of m random queries. For this reason, one of the basic goals of algorithmic privacy research is to
design efficient private algorithms that optimally adapt to the structure of any given collection
of queries. Phrased more specifically, this goal is to design algorithms achieving nearly optimal
sample complexity—the minimum dataset size required to privately produce answers to within a
prescribed accuracy—for any given workload of queries.
In this work, we address this problem in the context of answering statistical queries in both the
central and local models of differential privacy. Building on the projection mechanism [NTZ16], and
using the ideas behind Dudley’s chaining inequality, we propose new algorithms for privately answer-
ing statistical queries. Our algorithms are efficient and achieve instance optimal sample complexity
(up to constant factors, in certain parameter regimes) with respect to a large class of differentially
private algorithms. Specifically, for every collection of statistical queries, our algorithms provide
answers with constant average squared error with the minimum dataset size requirement amongst
all algorithms satisfying concentrated differential privacy (CDP) [DR16, BS16]. We further show
that our algorithmic techniques can be adapted to work in the local model of differential privacy,
where they again achieve optimal sample complexity amongst all algorithms with constant average
squared error.
1.1 Background
A dataset X is a multiset of n elements from a data universe X . A statistical (also referred to in
the literature as “linear”) query is specified by a function q : X → [0, 1]. Overloading notation, the
value of the query q on a dataset X is
q(X) =
1
n
∑
x∈X
q(x) ∈ [0, 1],
where dataset elements appear in the sum with their multiplicity. A query workload Q is simply
a set of m statistical queries. We use the notation Q(X) = (q(X))q∈Q ∈ [0, 1]m for the vector of
answers to the queries in Q on dataset X.
In the centralized setting in which the dataset X is held by a single trusted curator, we model
privacy by (zero-)concentrated differential privacy. This definition was introduced by Bun and
Steinke [BS16], and is essentially equivalent to the original definition of (mean-)concentrated dif-
ferential privacy proposed by Dwork and Rothblum [DR16], and closely related to Mironov’s Re´nyi
differential privacy [Mir17]. Before we state the definition, we recall that two datasets X,X ′ of size
n are neighboring if we can obtain X ′ from X by replacing only one of its elements with another
element of the universe X .
Definition 1.1. A randomized algorithm A satisfies ρ-zCDP if for any two neighboring datasets
X and X ′, and all γ ∈ (1,∞),
Dγ(A(X)‖A(X ′)) ≤ γρ,
where Dγ denotes the Re´nyi divergence of order γ measured in nats.
1This formulation is from [DR14], while the quantitative version is from [DN03].
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For the definition of Re´nyi divergence and further discussion of concentrated differential pri-
vacy, we refer the reader to Section 2.2. For now, we remark that concentrated differential privacy
is intermediate in strength between “pure” (ε-) and “approximate” ((ε, δ)-)differential privacy, in
the sense that every mechanism satisfying ε-differential privacy also satisfies ε
2
2 -zCDP, and ev-
ery mechanism satisfying ρ-zCDP also satisfies (ρ + 2
√
ρ log(1/δ), δ)-differential privacy for every
δ > 0 (see [BS16]). Our privacy-preserving techniques (i.e., Gaussian noise addition) give pri-
vacy guarantees which are most precisely captured by concentrated differential privacy. In general,
concentrated differential privacy captures a rich subclass (arguably, the vast majority) of the tech-
niques in the differential privacy literature, including Laplace and Gaussian noise addition, the
exponential mechanism [MT07], sparse vector [DR14], and private multiplicative weights [HR10].
Crucially, concentrated differential privacy admits a simple and tight optimal composition theorem
which matches the guarantees of the so-called “advanced composition” theorem for approximate
differential privacy [DRV10]. Because of these properties, concentrated differential privacy and its
variants has been adopted in a number of recent works on private machine learning, for exam-
ple [ACG+16, PFCW17, Lee17, PSM+18].
We also study the local model of differential privacy, in which the sensitive dataset X is no
longer held by a single trusted curator, but is instead distributed between n parties where each
party holds a single element xi. The parties engage in an interactive protocol with a potentially
untrusted server, whose goal is to learn approximate answers to the queries in Q. Each party is
responsible for protecting her own privacy, in the sense that the joint view of every party except i
should be (ε, δ)-differentially private with respect to the input xi. (See Section 2.3 for the precise
details of the definition.) Almost all industrial deployments of differential privacy, including those
at Google [EPK14], Apple [App], and Microsoft [DKY17], operate in the local model, and it has
been the subject of intense study over the past few years [BS15, BNSGT17, DJW18]. While the
local model of privacy offers stronger guarantees to individuals, it is more restrictive in terms of
the available privacy preserving techniques. In particular, algorithms based on the exponential
mechanism in general cannot be implemented in the local model [KLN+11]. Nevertheless, we show
that our algorithms can be relatively easily adapted to the local model with guarantees analogous
to the ones we get in the centralized model. We believe this is evidence for the flexibility of our
approach.
In order to discuss error guarantees for private algorithms, let us first introduce some notation.
We consider two natural measures of error: average (or root-mean squared) error, and worst-case
error. For an algorithm A we define its error on a query workload Q and databases of size n as
follows.
err2(Q,A, n) = max
X
E
∑
q∈Q
(A(X)q − q(X))2
m
1/2 = max
X
(
E
1
|Q|‖A(X) −Q(X)‖
2
2
)1/2
,
err∞(Q,A, n) = max
X
E
[
max
q∈Q
|A(X)q − q(X)|
]
= max
X
E‖A(X)−Q(X)‖∞,
where each maximum is over all datasets X of size n, A(X)q is the answer to query q given by the
algorithm A on input X, and expectations are taken with respect to the random choices of A. The
notation is used analogously in the local model, with an interactive protocol Π in the place of the
algorithm A.
2
1.2 Main Results
For the rest of this paper we will work with an equivalent formulation of the query release problem
which is more natural from the perspective of geometric techniques, and will also ease our notation.
For a given workload of m queries Q, we can define the set SQ ⊆ [0, 1]m by SQ = {Q(x) : x ∈ X}.
We can identify each data universe element x with the element Q(x) of SQ, so we can think of
X as just a multiset of elements of SQ; the true query answers Q(X) then just become the mean
of the elements in X. This motivates us to introduce the mean point problem: given a dataset X
of n elements from a (finite) universe X ⊆ [0, 1]m, approximate the mean X¯ = 1n
∑
x∈X x, where,
as usual, the dataset elements are enumerated with repetition. We assume that the algorithm is
explicitly given the set X . By analogy with the query release problem, we can define measures of
error for any given dataset X by
err2(X,A) =
(
E
1
m
‖A(X) − X¯‖22
)1/2
,
err∞(X,A) = E‖A(X)− X¯‖∞.
Similarly, we can define for any finite universe X the error measures
err2(X ,A, n) = max
X∈Xn
err2(X,A),
err∞(X ,A, n) = max
X∈Xn
err∞(X,A).
Algorithms for the query release problem can be used for the corresponding mean point problem,
and vice versa, with the same error and privacy guarantees. Therefore, for the rest of the paper
we will focus on the mean point problem with the understanding that analogous results for query
release follow immediately.
In this work, we give query release algorithms whose error guarantees naturally adapt to the
properties of the queries, or, equivalently, we give algorithms for the mean point problem that
adapt to the geometric properties of the set X . Notice that for any datasets X and X ′ of size n
that differ in a single element, X¯ − X¯ ′ ∈ 1n(X + (−X )), where X + (−X ) is the set of all pairwise
sums of elements in X and −X . Since differential privacy should hide the difference between X
and X ′, a private algorithm should not reveal where in the set X¯ + 1n(X + (−X )) the true mean
lies. This suggests that that the size of X +(−X ), and, relatedly, the size of X itself, should control
the sample complexity of the mean point problem. However, it is non-trivial to identify the correct
notion of “size”, and to design algorithms whose sample complexity adapts to this notion. In this
work we adopt separation numbers, which quantify how many well-separated points can be packed
in X , as a measure of the size of X . More precisely, for any set S ⊆ Rm and t > 0, we define the
separation number (a.k.a. packing number) as
P(S, t) = sup{|T | : T ⊆ S, ∀x, y ∈ T, x 6= y =⇒ ‖x− y‖2 > t
√
m}.
That is, P(S, t) is the size of the largest set of points in S whose normalized pairwise distances are
all greater than t. Analogously, we define the ℓ∞ separation number as
P∞(S, t) = sup{|T | : T ⊆ S, ∀x, y ∈ T, x 6= y =⇒ ‖x− y‖∞ > t}.
Our bounds for average error will be expressed in terms of P(X , t), and the bounds for worst case
error will be expressed in terms of P∞(X , t). We will give algorithms whose sample complexity is
controlled by the separation numbers, and we will also prove nearly matching lower bounds in the
regime of constant error.
3
1.2.1 Average Error
We propose two new algorithms for private query release: the Coarse Projection Mechanism and
the Chaining Mechanism. Both algorithms refine the Projection Mechanism of Nikolov, Talwar,
and Zhang [NTZ16]. Recall that the Projection Mechanism simply adds sufficient Gaussian noise
to X¯ in order to guarantee differential privacy, and then projects the noisy answer vector back
onto the convex hull of X , i.e. outputs the closest point to the noisy answer vector in the convex
hull of X with respect to the ℓ2 norm. Miraculously, this projection step can dramatically reduce
the error of the original noisy answer vector. The resulting error can be bounded by the Gaussian
mean width of X , which in turn is always at most polylogarithmic in the cardinality of X .
Our first refined algorithm, which we call the Coarse Projection Mechanism, instead projects
onto a minimal O(α)-cover of X , i.e. a set T ⊆ X such that T +O(α√m) ·Bm2 contains X . (Here,
“+” denotes the Minkowski sum, i.e. the set of all pairwise sums, and Bm2 is the unit Euclidean
ball in Rm.) Since this cover is potentially a much smaller set than X , the projection may incur
less error this way. The size of a minimal cover is closely related to the separation number, and
the separation numbers themselves are related to the Gaussian mean width by Dudley’s chaining
inequality. We use these connections in the analysis of our algorithm. The guarantees of the
mechanism are captured by the next theorem.
Theorem 1.2. There exists a constant C and a ρ-zCDP algorithm ACPM (the Coarse Projection
Mechanism) for the mean point problem, which for any finite X ⊆ [0, 1]m, achieves average error
err2(X ,ACPM , n) ≤ α as long as
n = Ω
(
log(1/α)
α2
√
ρ
· sup
{
t ·
√
log(P(X , t)) : t ≥ α/C
})
. (1)
Moreover, ACPM runs in time poly(|X |, n).
We note that the sample complexity of the Coarse Projection Mechanism can be much lower
than that of the Projection Mechanism. For example, consider a set X defined as a circular cone
with apex at the origin, and a ball of radius α
√
m centered at (1−α)√me1 as its base. (Here e1 is
the first standard basis vector.) Then, a direct calculation reveals that in order to achieve average
error α, the Projection Mechanism requires a dataset of size at least Ω(α−1
√
m). By contrast, the
Coarse Projection Mechanism would project onto the line segment from the apex to the center of
the base and achieve error α with a dataset of size O(α−1). While in this example X is not finite,
it can be discretized to a finite set without significantly changing the sample complexity.
Inspired by the proof of Dudley’s inequality, we give an alternative Chaining Mechanism whose
error guarantees are incomparable to the Coarse Projection Mechanism. Instead of just taking a
single cover of X , we take a sequence of progressively finer covers T1, . . . , Tk. This allows us to
write X as the Minkowski sum X 1+ . . .+X k +O(α√m) ·Bm2 , where the diameter of X i decreases
with i, while its cardinality grows. We can then decompose the mean point problem over X into
a sequence of k mean point problems, which we solve individually with the projection mechanism.
The next theorem captures the guarantees of this mechanism.
Theorem 1.3. There exists a constant C and a ρ-zCDP algorithm ACM (the Chaining Mechanism)
for the mean point problem, which for any finite X ⊆ [0, 1]m achieves average error err2(X ,A, n) ≤
α as long as
n = Ω
(
log(1/α)5/2
α2
√
ρ
· sup
{
t2 ·
√
log(P(X , t)) : t ≥ α/C
})
. (2)
Moreover, A runs in time poly(|X |, n).
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Notice that the sample complexity upper bound (2) depends on a larger power of log(1/α) than
the bound (1), but replaces t in the supremum with t2. This change can only improve the latter
term, as P(X , t) = 1 for any t ≥ 1.
1.2.2 Instance-Optimality
While our algorithms are generic, we show that for constant error, they achieve optimal sample
complexity for any given workload of queries. To be more precise about the instance-optimality of
our results, we define the sample complexity of answering a query workload Q with error α under
ρ-zCDP by
sc2ρ(Q, α) = min { n : ∃ ρ-zCDP A s.t. err2(Q,A, n) ≤ α },
sc∞ρ (Q, α) = min { n : ∃ ρ-zCDP A s.t. err∞(Q,A, n) ≤ α }.
In the local model we analogously define sc2,locε,δ (Q, α) and sc∞,locε,δ (Q, α) with the minimum taken
over all protocols satisfying (ε, δ)-local differential privacy.
For context, let us recall the sample complexity in the centralized model of some known al-
gorithms, and how it compares to the best possible sample complexity. For average error, the
projection mechanism [NTZ16] can answer any workload Q with error at most α under ρ-zCDP as
long as
n = Ω
(√
log |X |
α2
√
ρ
)
.
It is known that there exist workloads Q for which this bound on nmatches scρ(Q, α) up to constant
factors. One particularly natural example here is the workload of 2-way marginals on the universe
X = {0, 1}d, which consists of m = (d2) queries [BUV14]. Thus, the sample complexity of private
query release with respect to worst-case workloads of any given size is well-understood. However,
we know much less about optimal mechanisms and the behavior of scρ(Q, α) for specific workloads
Q. This behavior can depend strongly on the workload. For example, for the workload of threshold
queries Q = {qt}mt=1 defined on a totally ordered universe X = {1, . . . ,m} by qt(x) = 1{x < t}, we
have sample complexity only scρ(Q, α) = O˜( 1α ). This motivates the following problems:
1. Characterize scρ(Q, α) in terms of natural quantities associated with Q.
2. Identify efficient algorithms whose sample complexity on any workload Q nearly matches the
optimal sample complexity scρ(Q, α).
We call algorithms with the property in item 2. above approximately instance-optimal. Note that
it is a priori not clear that there should exist any efficient instance optimal algorithms. Here our
notion of efficiency is polynomial time in n, the number of queries, and the size of the universe X .
This is natural, as this is the size of the input to the algorithm, which needs to take a description
of the queries in addition to the database. One could wish for a more efficient algorithm when the
queries are specified implicitly, for example by a circuit, but this has been shown to be impossible
in general under cryptographic assumptions [DNR+09].
We prove lower bounds showing instance optimality for our algorithms when the error parameter
α is constant. Once again, we state the lower bounds for the mean point problem, rather than the
query release problem. The equivalence of the two problems implies that we get the same optimality
results for query release as for the mean point problem. To state the results we extend our notation
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above to the mean point problem, and define
sc2ρ(X , α) = min { n : ∃ ρ-zCDP A s.t. err2(X ,A, n) ≤ α },
sc∞ρ (X , α) = min { n : ∃ ρ-zCDP A s.t. err∞(X ,A, n) ≤ α },
and, analogously for sc2,locε,δ (X , α) and sc∞,locε,δ (X , α). Building on the packing lower bounds of Bun
and Steinke [BS16], we show that separation numbers also provide lower bounds on sc2ρ(X , α). The
following theorem is proved in the appendix.
Theorem 1.4. For any finite X ⊆ [0, 1]m and every α, ρ > 0, we have
sc2ρ(X , α) ≥ Ω
(
1
α
√
ρ
· sup
{
t ·
√
log(P(X , t)) : t ≥ 4α
})
. (3)
Comparing the lower bound (3) with our algorithmic guarantees (1) and (2), we see that the algo-
rithms in Theorems 1.2 and 1.3 can achieve error α on databases of size at most O˜( 1α )·sc2ρ(X , α/C ′),
where O˜ hides factors polynomial in log(1/α) and C ′ is a constant. In other words, when the error
α is constant, our mechanisms have sample complexity which is instance-optimal up to constant
factors. The constant error regime is practically the most interesting one and is widely studied
in the differential privacy literature. It captures the natural problem of identifying the smallest
database size on which the mean point problem (resp. the query release problem) can be solved
with non-trivial error. In his survey [Vad17] Vadhan asked explicitly for a characterization of the
sample complexity of counting queries in the constant error regime under approximate differential
privacy (Open Problem 5.25). Our results make a step towards resolving this question by giving a
characterization for the rich subclass of algorithms satisfying concentrated differential privacy.
Beyond the constant error regime, proving instance optimality results with tight dependence
on the error parameter α remains a tantalizing open problem. We note that we are not aware of
any X for which the sample complexity of the Chaining Mechanism is suboptimal by more than a
(log(1/α))O(1) factor.
1.2.3 Worst-Case Error
Using a variant of the chaining mechanism from Theorem 1.3, we get a guarantee for worst-case
error as well.
Theorem 1.5. There exists constant C, and a ρ-zCDP algorithm A that for any finite X ⊆ [0, 1]m
achieves err∞(X ,A, n) ≤ α as long as
n = Ω
(
log(m) log(1/α)5/2
α2
√
ρ
· sup
{
t2 ·
√
log(P∞(X , t)) : t ≥ α/C
})
. (4)
Moreover, A runs in time poly(|X |, n).
This result shows the flexibility of the chaining mechanism. The analysis of the coarse projection
mechanism relied crucially on Dudley’s inequality, which is tailored to Euclidean space and the
Gaussian mean width. There are, in general, no mechanisms with worst-case error guarantees
whose sample complexity depends on the Gaussian mean width, so it is unclear how to adapt
the coarse projection mechanism to worst-case error. Nevertheless, by incorporating the idea of
chaining used in the proof of Dudley’s inequality inside the algorithm itself, we are able to derive
an analogous result.
A lower bound analogous to Theorem 1.4 for worst-case error reveals that the sample complexity
of the algorithm in Theorem 1.5 on workload Q with error α is at most O˜( log(m)α ) · sc∞ρ (Q, α/C).
I.e., we get instance-optimality up to a O(logm) factor for constant α.
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1.2.4 Local Differential Privacy
Illustrating further the flexibility of our techniques, we show that the Coarse Projection Mechanism
and the Chaining Mechanism can be adapted to the local model. The protocols we design are
non-interactive, with each party sending a single message to the server, and satisfy pure ε-local
differential privacy. The protocols are in fact very similar to our algorithms in the central model,
except that instead of Gaussian noise we use a variant of the local mean estimation algorithm
from [DJW18] to achieve privacy. The other steps in the Coarse Projection and the Chaining
Mechanisms are either pre- or post-processing of the data and can be adapted seamlessly to the
local model.
Theorem 1.6. There exists a constant C and a non-interactive ε-LDP protocol ΠCPM that for
any finite X ⊆ [0, 1]m achieves average error err2(X ,ΠCPM , n) ≤ α as long as
n = Ω
(
log(1/α)2
α4ε2
· sup{t2 · log(P(X , t)) : t ≥ α/C}) . (5)
Furthermore, there exists a non-interactive ε-LDP protocol ΠCM that achieves average error
err2(X ,ΠCM , n) ≤ α as long as
n = Ω
(
log(1/α)6
α4ε2
· sup{t4 · log(P(X , t)) : t ≥ α/C}) . (6)
Both protocols run in time poly(|X |, n).
Moreover, for constant average error α, our algorithms achieve instance-optimal sample com-
plexity up to constant factors. This is true even with respect to (ε, δ)-LDP algorithms permitting
“sequential” interaction between parties (see Section 2.3 for details of the model). The theorem is
proved in the appendix using the framework of Bassily and Smith [BS15]
Theorem 1.7. For any finite X ⊆ [0, 1]m, every α > 0, and any δ satisfying 0 < δ < α2ε3C log(|X |/ε)
for a sufficiently large constant C, we have
sc2,locε,δ (X , α) ≥ Ω
(
1
α2ε2
· sup{t2 · log(P(X , t)) : t ≥ 6α}) . (7)
It is an interesting open problem to extend these instance optimality results to worst-case error.
While the lower bound extends in a straightforward way, our mechanisms do not, as there is no
analog of the projection mechanism for worst-case error, and also no analog of the multiplicative
weights mechanism in the local model. Moreover, it is known that in the local model packing lower
bounds like these in Theorem 1.7 can be exponentially far from the true sample complexity with
respect to worst-case error. For instance, Kasiviswanathan et al. [KLN+11] showed that learning
parities over the universe X = {0, 1}d has sample complexity exponential in d in the local model,
and learning parities easily reduces to answering parity queries with small constant worst-case error.
At the same time, packing lower bounds can only show a lower bound which is polynomial in d.
Thus, worst case error has substantially different behavior from average error in the local model
and requires different techniques.
1.3 Related Work
Instance-optimal query release was previously studied in a line of work that brought the tools
of asymptotic convex geometry to differential privacy [HT10, BDKT12, NTZ16, Nik15, KN17].
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However, despite significant effort, completely resolving these questions for approximate differential
privacy appears to remain out of reach of current techniques.
The papers [HT10, BDKT12] focus on pure differential privacy, and their results only apply for
very small values of α, while here we focus on the regime of constant α. A characterization for pure
differential privacy with constant α is known [Rot11, BS16, Vad17] based on the same geometric
quantities considered in this work. When phrased in our language, these works show that for every
constant error parameter α, the sample complexity of the mean point problem with pure differential
privacy is characterized up to constant factors by the logarithm of an appropriate separation number
of the set X . The sample complexity lower bound follows from a packing argument. Meanwhile,
the upper bound is obtained by using the exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [MT07]
to identify a point in a minimal cover of X which is as close as possible to X¯ . Unlike our algorithms,
this application of the exponential mechanism runs in time super-polynomial in X .
While we prove instance-optimality of our algorithms using similar lower bound techniques (i.e.,
the generalization of packing arguments to CDP from [BS16]), our new algorithms appear to be
completely different. There is no known analogue of the exponential mechanism that is tailored to
achieve optimal sample complexity for CDP, and our algorithms are instead based on the projection
mechanism.
The papers [NTZ16, Nik15] focus on approximate differential privacy, and give results for the
entire range of α, but their bounds are loose by factors polynomial in log |X |. We avoid such gaps,
since for many natural workloads, such as marginal queries, |X | is exponential in the other natural
parameters of Q. The recent paper [KN17] is also very closely related to our work, but does not
prove tight upper and lower bounds on scρ(Q, α) for arbitrary Q.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we define basic notation, state the definitions of concentrated differential privacy
and local differential privacy, and state the known algorithms which will serve as building blocks
for our own algorithms. We also describe the geometric tools which will be used throughout this
paper.
2.1 Notation
We use the notation A . B to denote the existence of an absolute constant C such that A ≤ CB,
where A and B themselves may depend on a number of parameters. Similarly, A & B denotes the
existence of an absolute constant C such that A ≥ B/C.
We use ‖ · ‖2 and ‖ · ‖∞ for the standard ℓ2 and ℓ∞ norms. We use Bm2 = {x : ‖x‖2 ≤ 1}
to denote the unit ℓ2 ball in R
m. For two subsets S, T ⊂ Rm, the notation S + T denotes the
Minkowski sum, i.e. the set {s+ t : s ∈ S, t ∈ T}.
For a real-valued random variable Z we use the notation ‖Z‖p = (E|Z|p)1/p.
2.2 Concentrated Differential Privacy
Recalling Definition 1.1, we say that a randomized algorithm A satisfies ρ-zCDP if for any two
neighboring datasets X,X ′ and all γ ∈ (1,∞), we have
Dγ(A(X)‖A(X ′)) ≤ γρ.
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Here, Dγ(·‖·) denotes the Re´nyi divergence of order γ. For probability density functions P,Q : Ω→
R with P absolutely continuous with respect to Q, this quantity is defined as
Dγ(P‖Q) = 1
1− γ log
(∫
Ω
P (x)γQ(x)1−γ dx
)
.
For two random variables Y,Z, the divergence Dγ(Y ‖Z) is defined as the divergence of their prob-
ability densities.
One of the crucial properties of CDP is the following tight composition theorem which matches
the guarantees of the so-called “advanced composition” theorem for approximate differential pri-
vacy [DRV10].
Lemma 2.1 ([BS16]). Assume that the algorithm A1(·) satisfies ρ1-zCDP, and, for every y in the
range of A1, the algorithm A2(·, y) satisfies ρ2-zCDP. Then the algorithm A defined by A(X) =
A2(X,A1(X)) satisfies (ρ1 + ρ2)-zCDP.
We remark that as a special case of Lemma 2.1, one can take A2 to be a 0-zCDP algorithm
which does not directly access the sensitive dataset X at all. In this case, the combined algorithm
A satisfies ρ1-zCDP, showing that zCDP algorithms can be postprocessed without affecting their
privacy guarantees.
Our algorithms are designed by carefully applying two basic building blocks: the Projection
and the Private Multiplicative Weights mechanisms. Below we state their guarantees for the mean
point problem.
In order to state the error guarantees for the projection mechanism, we need a couple of
definitions. First, let us define the support function of a set S ⊆ Rm on any x ∈ Rm by
hS(x) = supy∈S〈y, x〉, where 〈·, ·〉 is the standard inner product. If Z ∼ N(0, I) is a standard
Gaussian random variable in Rm, then we define the Gaussian mean width of a set S ⊆ Rm by
g(S) = EhS(Z).
Lemma 2.2 ([NTZ16]). Let m ∈ N and let ∆ > 0. There exists a mechanism APM (The Projection
Mechanism) such that, for every finite set X ⊆ ∆√m · Bm2 ,
err2(X ,A, n) ≤
(
∆g(X )
n
√
2ρm
)1/2
≤ ∆(log |X |)
1/4
(2ρ)1/4
√
n
.
Moreover, APM runs in time poly(|X |, n).
Lemma 2.3 ([HR10]). There exists a mechanism APMW (The Private Multiplicative Weights
Mechanism) such that, for any finite X ⊆ ∆ · [−1, 1]m,
err∞(X ,A, n) = O
(
∆(log |X |)1/4(logm)1/2
ρ1/4
√
n
)
.
Moreover, APM runs in time poly(|X |, n).
2.3 Local Differential Privacy
In the local model, the private database X is distributed among n parties, each party holding
exactly one element of X. For convenience, we index the parties by the integers from 1 to n,
and denote by xi the element of X held by party i. The parties together with a server engage
in a protocol Π in order to compute some function of the entire database X. Here we consider
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sequentially interactive protocols (with non-interactive ones as a special case), as defined by Duchi,
Wainright, and Jordan [DJW18]. The protocol is defined by a collection of randomized algorithms
Π1, . . .Πn. Algorithm Πi takes as input xi and a message Yi−1 received from party i − 1, and
produces a pair (Yi, Zi), where Yi is sent to party i+ 1, and Zi is sent to the server. Parties 1 and
n are exceptions: Π1 only takes x1 as input, and Πn only produces Zn as output. Then the server
runs a randomized algorithm A on inputs Z1, . . . , Zn to produce the final output of the protocol.
We use Π(X) to denote the union of all outputs of the algorithms. The running time of the protocol
is the total running time of the algorithms Π1, . . . ,Πn and A.
Note that a special case of a sequentially interactive protocol is a non-interactive protocol, in
which Πi ignores Yi and only depends on its private input xi. Non-interactive protocols roughly
capture the randomized response model of Warner [War65], and their study in the context of
differential privacy goes back to [DMNS06].
To formulate our privacy definition in the local model, let us recall the notions of max-divergence
and approximate max-divergence, defined for any two random variables X and Y on the same
probability space by
D∞(X‖Y ) = sup
S
P(X ∈ S)
P(Y ∈ S) D
δ
∞(X‖Y ) = sup
S
P(X ∈ S)− δ
P(Y ∈ S) ,
where the supremum is over measurable sets S in the support of X. With this notation, the
standard definition of an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm [DMNS06] is as follows.
Definition 2.4. A randomized algorithm A satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy if for datasets X and
X ′ we have
Dδ∞(A(X)‖A(X ′)) ≤ ε.
We will need the simple composition theorem for differential privacy. See the book [DR14] for
a proof.
Lemma 2.5. Assume that the algorithm A1(·) satisfies (ε1, δ1)-differential privacy, and, for every
y in the range of A1, the algorithm A2(·, y) satisfies (ε2, δ2)-differential privacy. Then the algorithm
A defined by A(X) = A2(X,A1(X)) satisfies (ε1 + ε2, δ1 + δ2)-differential privacy.
The privacy definition for a sequentially interactive protocol in the local model we adopt is as
follows.
Definition 2.6. A protocol Π in the local model satisfies (ε, δ)-local differential privacy (LDP)
if the algorithm Π1 satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy with respect to the single element dataset
{x1}, and, for every 2 ≤ i ≤ n and every y in the range of Πi−1, the algorithm Πi(·, y) satisfies
(ε, δ)-differential privacy with respect to the single element dataset {xi}.
When a protocol satisfies (ε, 0)-LDP, we also say that it satisfies ε-LDP.
We note that while our protocols work in the non-interactive pure LDP model (i.e. δ = 0), our
lower bounds work against the larger class of sequentially interactive protocols and approximate
LDP (i.e. sufficiently small but nonzero δ).
2.4 Packings, Coverings, and Dudley’s Inequality
Recall the definitions of separation numbers given in the Introduction: for a set S ⊆ Rm and a
proximity parameter t > 0 we denote
P(S, t) = sup{|T | : T ⊆ S, ∀x, y ∈ T, x 6= y =⇒ ‖x− y‖2 > t
√
m};
P∞(S, t) = sup{|T | : T ⊆ S, ∀x, y ∈ T, x 6= y =⇒ ‖x− y‖∞ > t}.
10
Note the non-standard scaling of P(S, t), which we chose because it corresponds better to the
definition of average error.
To prove the optimality of our algorithms, we make use of the well-known duality between
packings (captured by separation numbers) and coverings. We say that a set T ⊂ Rm is a t-
covering of S with respect to metric d if for every x ∈ S there exists a point y ∈ T such that
d(x, y) ≤ t. This definition gives rise to the family of covering numbers (in ℓ2 or ℓ∞) of a compact
set S ⊆ Rm, defined by
N (S, t) = inf{|T | : ∀x ∈ S ∃y ∈ T s.t. ‖x− y‖ ≤ t√m},
N∞(S, t) = inf{|T | : ∀x ∈ S ∃y ∈ T s.t. ‖x− y‖∞ ≤ t}.
The next lemma relating separation numbers to covering numbers is folklore (see e.g. Chapter
4 of [AAGM15] for a proof).
Lemma 2.7. Let S be a compact subset of Rm, and t > 0 be a real number. Let T be a maximal
subset of S with respect to inclusion s.t. ∀x, y ∈ T : ‖x − y‖2 ≥ t
√
m (resp. ‖x − y‖∞ ≥ t).
Then T is a t-cover of S, i.e. for any x ∈ S there exists a y ∈ T such that ‖x − y‖2 ≤ t
√
m
(resp. ‖x− y‖∞ ≤ t). This implies
N (S, t) ≤ P(S, t), N∞(S, t) ≤ P∞(S, t).
We will sometimes have to contend explicitly with the sets described above. A set T ⊂ Rm is
called a t-separated set with respect to a metric d if for every x, y ∈ T , we have d(x, y) ≥ t. In what
follows, when we discuss t-separated sets in the context of the error measure err2 the underlying
metric will be the scaled ℓ2 norm d(x, y) =
1√
m
‖x − y‖2, and in the context of the error measure
err∞ the underlying metric will be the ℓ∞ norm d(x, y) = ‖x− y‖∞.
Dudley’s Inequality is a tool which allows us to relate the Gaussian mean width of a set X ⊂ Rn
with the family of covering numbers of X at all scales. (Note that the normalization factor of √m
appearing in our definition of separation/covering numbers causes this statement to differ by a
factor of
√
m from its usual formulation.)
Lemma 2.8 ([LT91, Chapter 11.1]). For any subset X ⊂ Rm, with diameter √m∆(X ), we have
g(X ) . √m
∫ ∆(X )
0
√
logN (X , t) dt.
2.5 Subgaussian Random Variables
We recall the standard definition of a subgaussian random variable.
Definition 2.9. We say that a mean zero random variable Z ∈ Rm is σ-subgaussian, if for every
fixed θ ∈ Rm, we have
E exp(〈Z, θ〉) ≤ exp(σ2‖θ‖2).
For an arbitrary random variable Z ∈ Rm we say that it is σ-subgaussian if Z − EZ is σ-
subgaussian.
We recall some basic facts about subgaussian random variables in the appendix.
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3 Decompositions of the Universe
In this section we show a simple decomposition lemma (Lemma 3.3) that underlies all of our new
algorithms. We begin by identifying an important property common to both error measures err2
and err∞ which will be essential to Lemma 3.3.
Definition 3.1 (Subadditive error measure). Let X ⊂ Rm be a finite universe enumerated as
X = {x1, x2, . . . xT }. For each xi, consider an arbitrary decomposition xi = x1i + x2i , and define
X (1) = {x1i : 1 ≤ i ≤ T}, X (2) = {x2i : 1 ≤ i ≤ T}. This decomposition induces, for any dataset
X ∈ X n, a pair of datasets X1 ∈ (X (1))n,X2 ∈ (X (2))n.
We say that an error measure err(X,A) is a subadditive error measure if for every finite
universe X , every decomposition as above, every dataset X ∈ X n and every pair of algorithms (or
local protocols) A1,A2, we have
err(X,A) ≤ err(X1,A1) + err(X2,A2),
where the algorithm (resp. local protocol) A is defined by A(X) = A1(X1) +A2(X2).
Both error measures of interest in this paper are subadditive error measures.
Claim 3.2. Both err2 and err∞ are subadditive error measures.
The proof of this claim can be found in the appendix. It follows directly from the triangle
inequality for ℓ2 and ℓ∞ norms respectively.
Lemma 3.3. Let X ⊂ Rm be a subset of a Minkowski sum X ⊂ X (1) + X (2) + . . . + X (k), and
let π1, . . . , πk be functions, respectively, from X to X (i) such that x =
∑k
i=1 πi(x). Consider an
arbitrary subadditive error measure err. Let A1,A2, . . .Ak be a sequence of algorithms (respectively
protocols in the local model) such that for every j,
1. err(X j ,Aj) ≤ αj , and
2. Aj satisfies ρj-zCDP (resp. εj-LDP).
Then we can construct a ρ-zCDP mechanism (resp. ε-LDP protocol) A with err(X ,A) ≤∑kj=1 αj ,
where ρ =
∑k
j=1 ρj (resp. ε =
∑k
j=1 εj).
Moreover, the running time of A is bounded by the sum of the running times of A1, . . . ,Ak,
and the sum of the running times to compute π1, . . . , πk on n vectors from X . If A1, . . . ,Ak are
non-interactive local protocols, then so is A.
Proof. We first prove the lemma for CDP. For a database X ∈ X n, we can consider a sequence of
induced databases X1, . . . ,Xk, where Xj is derived from X by applying πj pointwise to each one
of its elements. Given a database X we compute independently Aj(Xj) for every j, and release∑k
j=1Aj(Xj).
The privacy of A follows from the composition properties of zCDP (Lemma 2.1), and postpro-
cessing — i.e. by the composition lemma we know that releasing (A1(X1), . . .Ak(Xk)) satisfies
ρ-zCDP, and by postprocessing
∑k
j=1Aj(Xj) has the same privacy guarantee.
Moreover, the error bound is satisfied by inductively applying subadditivity of the error measure.
Indeed, for any specific database X, we have err(X,A) ≤∑kj=1 err(Xj ,Aj), and therefore
err(X ,A) = max
X∈Xn
err(X,A) ≤
k∑
j=1
max
Xj∈(X (j))n
err(Xj ,Aj) ≤
k∑
j=1
err(X j ,Ai).
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The proof for LDP is analogous: each party i, given input xi, for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k runs the
local protocol Aj with input πj(xi). The protocols can be run in parallel. At the end the server
can compute and output the sum of the outputs of the local protocols. The error analysis is the
same as above, and the privacy bound ε ≤ ∑kj=1 εj follows from the simple composition theorem
(Lemma 2.5) for (pure) differential privacy.
4 Algorithms for Concentrated Differential Privacy
In this section we define our two new algorithms in the centralized model. In the subsequent section
we describe how to adapt them to the local model.
4.1 The Coarse Projection Mechanism
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.2 giving the guarantees of the coarse projection mechanism.
For a finite X ⊂ Rm, let X (1) ⊂ Rm be an inclusion-maximal α2 -separated subset of X with
respect to the metric d(x, y) = 1√
m
‖x− y‖2. Let X (2) = α2
√
mBm2 . We claim that X ⊂ X (1)+X (2):
this follows since, by Lemma 2.7, X (1) is a α2 -cover of X .
Let A1 : (X (1))n → X (1) be the projection mechanism (as in Lemma 2.2) and let A2 be the
trivial 0-zCDP mechanism where A2(x) = 0 for all x. Note that A2 has error err2(X (2),A2) ≤ α2 .
We now invoke Lemma 3.3 with X (1),X (2) and A1,A2 as described, and using the (subadditive)
error measure err2. As mentioned in the introduction, this gives the following simple mechanism:
1. Round each element x of the dataset X to the nearest point x(1) in the covering X (1) to get
a rounded dataset X(1).
2. Add enough Gaussian noise to X¯(1) to preserve ρ-zCDP; let the resulting noisy vector be Y˜ .
3. Output the closest point in conv{X(1)} to Y˜ in ℓ2.
We will use the following lemma to analyze the error incurred by the projection mechanism
(corresponding to steps 2. and 3. above).
Lemma 4.1. For any α > 0 and any α2 -separated set S ⊂ Rm with diameter
√
m∆, we have
g(S) .
√
m log(∆/α) sup
{
t
√
logP(S, t) : t ≥ α/4
}
.
Proof. By Dudley’s inequality (Lemma 2.8), we have
g(S) .
√
m
∫ ∆
0
√
logN (S, t) dt
≤
∫ α/4
0
√
logN (S, t) dt+
∫ ∆
α/4
√
logN (S, t). (8)
Now we can bound the two summands on the right hand side separately. Note that for t < α/4,
because S is α2 -separated, we have N (S, t) = |S| ≤ P(S, α/2) — indeed, every covering of radius α4
has to contain every point of S. Therefore∫ α/4
0
√
logN (S, t) dt ≤ α
4
√
logP(S, α/4). (9)
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On the other hand, for the second summand, we have∫ ∆
α/4
√
logN (S, t) dt =
∫ ∆
α/4
t
√
logN (S, t) dt
t
≤ sup
t>α/4
{t
√
logN (S, t)}
∫ ∆
α/4
dt
t
≤ sup
t>α/4
{t
√
logN (S, t)} ln ∆
α/4
≤ sup
t>α/4
{t
√
logP(S, t)} ln ∆
α/4
. (10)
The last inequality follows from the duality between packing and covering numbers (Lemma 2.7).
By (9) and (10), we have a bound
g(S) .
√
m log
∆
α
sup
t≥α/4
(t
√
logP(S, t)).
This completes the proof.
Using the guarantee of the projection mechanism (Lemma 2.2), Lemma 3.3 shows that
err2(X ,A) ≤ err2(X (1),A1) + err2(X (2),A2)
≤
(
∆g(X (1))
n
√
2ρm
)1/2
+
α
2
.
Hence, as soon as n & ∆g(X
(1))√
ρmα2
, the first term is bounded by α/2, and the total error err2(A,X ) ≤ α.
By applying Lemma 4.1, we can deduce that it is enough to have
n &
∆√
ρmα2
√
m log(∆/α) sup
{
t
√
logP(X (1), t) : t ≥ α/4
}
=
∆ log(∆/α)√
ρα2
sup
{
t
√
logP(X (1), t) : t ≥ α/4
}
Since X (1) ⊂ X , we have P(X (1), t) ≤ P(X , t) for each t. Therefore, as soon as
n &
∆ log(∆/α)√
ρα2
sup
{
t
√
logP(X , t) : t ≥ α/4
}
we have err2(A,X ) ≤ α. Finally, because X ⊂ [0, 1]m in the statement of Theorem 1.2 has diameter
bounded by
√
m, we can take ∆ = 1. This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.2.
4.2 The Chaining Mechanism for Average Error
In this section we will prove Theorem 1.3. The main ingredient of the proof is following decompo-
sition lemma for a finite set X ⊂ [0, 1]m ⊂ √mB2. This decomposition will be used together with
Lemma 3.3, to get the desired algorithm.
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Lemma 4.2. Let ‖ · ‖ be a norm on Rm and let B = {x ∈ Rm : ‖x‖ ≤ 1} be its unit ball. For
∆ ≥ 0, α < 1, and an arbitrary set X ⊂ ∆B, there exist a sequence of subsets X (1), . . .X (k), with
k = ⌈log 2α⌉, such that X ⊂ X (1) + . . . + X (k) + α2∆B, where X (i) ⊂ 2−i+1∆B, and X (i) is 2−i-
separated with respect to the metric d(x, y) = ‖x− y‖/∆. Moreover, X (1), . . .X (k) can be computed
in time polynomial in m and |X | if ‖ · ‖ can be computed in time polynomial in m.
Proof. Let S1, S2, . . . Sk ⊂ X be a sequence of subsets such that each Sj is a maximal 2−j-separated
set in the metric d(x, y) defined above. By the maximality of each set, we have
∀x ∈ X ∃y ∈ Sj s.t. ‖x− y‖ ≤ 2−j∆. (11)
Let us define a mapping πj : X → Sj such that for each x, we have
‖πj(x)− x‖ ≤ 2−j∆ (12)
Finally, we define X (1) = S1, and for j > 1, we will take X (j) := {x− πj−1(x) : x ∈ Sj}.
We first observe that X ⊂ X (1)+X (2)+ . . .+X (k)+2−k∆B. Indeed, for any x ∈ X , we can take
xk = πk(x), and xj = πj(xj+1) for every j < k. Then for every j < k we have xj+1 − xj ∈ X (j+1),
and we have the telescoping decomposition
x = x1 +
k−1∑
j=1
(xj+1 − xj) + (x− xk).
Finally, by definition of xk, we have ‖x−xk‖ = ‖x−πk(x)‖ ≤ 2−k∆, or equivalently x−xk ∈ 2−k∆B.
Observe now that every set X (j) satisfies X (j) ⊂ 2−j+1∆B. This is the case because every
element of X (j) takes the form x − πj−1(x) for some x ∈ X , and all of these vectors are bounded
by 2−j+1∆ in the ‖ · ‖ norm by (12).
Using Lemma 4.2 with the Euclidean norm ‖ ·‖ = ‖ ·‖2 and ∆ =
√
m, we get the decomposition
X ⊂ X (1)+ . . .+X (k)+ α2
√
mBm2 , to which we apply Lemma 3.3. Each algorithm Aj for 1 ≤ j ≤ k
is the projection mechanism (as in Lemma 2.2) instantiated with privacy parameter ρj = ρ/k, and
Ak+1 (corresponding to the set X (k+1) = α2
√
mBm2 ) is the trivial mechanism which always outputs
0.
Let us now analyze the composed mechanism guaranteed by Lemma 3.3. First, observe that this
mechanism satisfies ρ-zCDP. Indeed, as guaranteed by Lemma 3.3, it satisfies zCDP with privacy
parameter
∑k+1
j=1 ρj =
∑k
j=1
ρ
k + 0 = ρ.
We now turn to analysis of the error of the composed mechanism. Observe first that the error of
the trivial algorithm Ak+1 is bounded as err2(Ak+1, α2
√
mBm2 ) ≤ α2 . Let us now consider the error of
the mechanism Aj, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. The set X (j) is contained in 2−j+1√mB2, and |X (j)| ≤ P(X , 2−j)
because X (j) is 2−j-separated — hence we can apply Lemma 2.2 to deduce that for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, we
have
err2(Aj,X (j)) ≤ 2
−j+1(logP(X , 2−j))1/4
(2ρ/k)1/4
√
n
.
We wish to pick n large enough, so that for every j ≤ k, we have err2(Aj,X (j)) ≤ α2k . After
rearranging, this will be satisfied as long as for every j, we have
n &
2−2j
√
logP(X , 2−j)k5/2√
ρα2
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and since supj≤k 2−2j
√
logP(X , 2−j) ≤ supt≥α/2 t2
√
logP(X , t), it is enough to have
n &
sup{t2√P(X , t) : t ≥ α/2}k5/2√
ρα2
Finally, recalling that k = O(log 1α), and the statement of Theorem 1.3 follows.
4.3 The Chaining Mechanism for Worst-Case Error
The proof of Theorem 1.5 is analogous to the previous proof of Theorem 1.3. Here we only give a
brief overview of the proof, and defer the details to the appendix.
Our algorithm for worst-case error again applies Lemma 3.3 to a suitable decomposition X ⊂
X (1) + · · · + X (k) + α2Bm∞, which we get from Lemma 4.2 with the norm ‖ · ‖ = ‖ · ‖∞ and ∆ = 1.
The basic algorithm we use as a building block to solve each subproblem on universe X (j) is the
Private Multiplicative Weights algorithm (Lemma 2.3) instead of the projection mechanism.
5 Algorithms for Local Differential Privacy
In this section we describe our results in the local model. Once again, we consider the mean point
problem, where each party receives xi ∈ X ⊂ Rm, which together form a dataset X, and the
goal is to approximately and privately compute X¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1 xi. We show how to adapt the coarse
projection and the chaining mechanisms to the local model and via packing lower bounds show that
the sample complexity of our mechanisms is optimal up to constants when the error parameter α
is constant.
5.1 Local Projection Mechanism
First we discuss a locally private analogue of the projection mechanism. Variants of it appear
to have been known to experts, and, independently of our work, Bassily recently published and
analyzed a slightly different version [Bas18]. The main observation behind the local projection
mechanism is that Gaussian noise addition in the usual projection mechanism can be replaced
with a locally private point release mechanism, while the projection step can be performed by the
server. The error guarantee of the mechanism — to be described in full shortly — is captured by
the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. There exist a non-interactive ε-LDP protocol for the mean point problem ΠLPM ,
such that for every finite set X ⊆ ∆√mBm2 ,
err2(X ,ΠLPM , n) .
(
∆g(X )
ε
√
nm
)1/2
≤
(
∆4 log |X |
ε2n
)1/4
.
Moreover, ΠLPM has running time polynomial in n, m, and |X |.
This error bound should be compared with the bounds for concentrated differential privacy in
the centralized model (Lemma 2.2) — the dependence on the size of the database and the privacy
parameter is worse, as the error scales down as n−1/4 with the size of the database in local model,
as opposed to n−1/2 in centralized model.
We will now proceed with a description of ΠLPM and the proof of this theorem. On input xi,
each party i samples a random variable Wxi and sends it to the server. In Section 5.1.1 we describe
the distribution of Wx and prove the following properties of it.
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Lemma 5.2. For any x ∈ ∆√mBm2 there exists a random variable Wx such that
1. Wx can be sampled in time polynomial in m on input x,
2. EWx = x,
3. Wx is σ-subgaussian with σ = O(ε
−1∆
√
m), and
4. for any x, y ∈ Bm2 , we have D∞(Wx ||Wy) ≤ ε.
Assuming this lemma, we will proceed with the proof of Theorem 5.1. The protocol is as follows:
1. Each party i samples Wxi and sends it to the server;
2. The server computes the average W¯ := 1n
∑
Wxi of the responses.
3. The server computes a projection of W¯ onto the convex hull of X , that is
W ∗ = argmin
w∈conv(X )
‖w − W¯‖2, (13)
and outputs W ∗.
Note that this mechanism satisfies ε-LDP — the local differential privacy property corresponds
directly to the bound on the max-divergence of the variables Wx in item 3 in the statement of
Lemma 5.2.
The accuracy guarantee follows from the original accuracy analysis of the projection mechanism
— the following statement is proved, for instance in [NTZ12, DNT14]. We give the short proof in
the appendix for completeness.
Lemma 5.3. Consider a convex polytope K, and random variable W with EW = x ∈ K. Take
W ∗ := argminw∈K ‖w −W‖2. Then
E‖W ∗ − x‖22 . E sup
w∈K
〈w,W − x〉.
Notice that ifW is a Gaussian centered at x, then the right hand side above is g(K). Lemma C.3
then implies that ifW is σ-subgaussian, then the right hand side above is bounded, up to constants,
by σg(K). We have the following corollary.
Corollary 5.4. Consider a convex polytope K, and σ-subgaussian random variable W with EW =
x ∈ K. Take W ∗ := argminw∈K ‖w −W‖2. Then
E‖W ∗ − x‖22 . σg(K).
Note that in ΠLPM , as described above, EW¯ = X¯, and moreover W¯ is σ-subgaussian with
σ = O(∆
√
m√
nε
). By applying Corollary 5.4 with this σ, and K = conv(X ), and using our definition
of average error
err2(X ,ΠLPM , n) =
(
1
m
E‖W ∗ − X¯‖22
)1/2
≤
(
∆g(X )√
εnm
)1/2
we complete the proof of Theorem 5.1.
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5.1.1 Local point release
In this section we prove Lemma 5.2. We focus on the case x ∈ Bm2 , i.e. ∆ = 1√m in the statement
of the lemma. The general case follows by scaling Wx defined below by ∆
√
m.
Our construction of Wx is a variant of the distribution defined in [DJW18] for the mean esti-
mation problem in the local model. We replace their use of the uniform distribution on the sphere
with the Gaussian, which is slightly easier to analyze. The definition of Wx follows.
Definition 5.5. For a given x ∈ Bm2 , and ε > 0, we define a random variable Wx as follows.
• Take Ux ∈ {± x‖x‖2 }, such that EUx = x.
• Draw Z at random from a Gaussian distribution Z ∼ N (0, I).
• Given Z and Ux, take Sx ∈ {±1} at random, from a distribution such that E[Sx|Z,Ux] =
ε
3 sign(〈Z,Ux〉).
• Define Wx = 3√πεZSx.
We will first show that the expectation of Wx is correct — this is an almost direct consequence
of the construction.
Claim 5.6. For any x ∈ Bm2 and the random variable Wx defined as in Definition 5.5, we have
EWx = x.
Proof. If we condition on Ux = y0, we have
E[〈Wx, y0〉 |Ux = y0] = E[〈Z, y0〉 · ε
3
sign(〈Z, y0〉) · 3√
πε
] = E
|〈Z, y0〉|√
π
= ‖y0‖2 = 1.
On the other hand, for any y1 ⊥ y0, we have
E[〈Wx, y1〉|Ux = y0] = 1√
π
E sign(〈Z, y0〉)〈Z, y1〉 = 1√
π
E[sign(〈Z, y0〉)]E[〈Z, y1〉] = 0,
because 〈Z, y0〉 and 〈Z, y1〉 are independent. Therefore E[Wx|Ux = y0] = y0, and, by the law of
total expectation, EWx = EUx[EWx [Wx|Ux]] = EUx = x.
By a direct application of Fact C.4 to the variables Z and Sx, we obtain the following claim.
Claim 5.7. For any x ∈ Bn2 , the random variable Wx is O(ε−1)-subgaussian.
We will shift focus to bounding the max divergence between Wx and Wy. A direct calculation
shows the following well-known fact.
Fact 5.8. For any 0 ≤ ε ≤ 12 and any two random variables S1, S2 ∈ {±1} with |ES1|, |ES2| ≤ ε,
we have D∞(S1 ||S2) ≤ 3ε.
Claim 5.9. For x, y ∈ Bn2 , we have D∞(Wx ||Wy) ≤ ε.
Proof. We can consider explicitly releasing (Z,Sx) instead, since they entirely define Wx, and so,
by the data-processing inequality, D∞(Wx||Wy) ≤ D∞((Z,Sx)||(Z,Sy)). For any fixed z, the max-
divergence between (Sx|Z = z) and (Sy|Z = z) is bounded by ε by Fact 5.8 — this is enough to
conclude that densities of (Z,Sx) and (Z,Sy) are within a e
ε multiplicative factor.
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5.2 Local Coarse and Chaining Mechanisms
To achieve Theorem 1.6 the local projection mechanism can be lifted to a coarse projection and
chaining mechanism via the same general framework as discussed in Section 4.2.
The proof of the first bound for A1 in Theorem 1.6 is essentially identical to Theorem 1.2: we
consider the same decomposition of the universe X ⊂ X (1) + X (2), where X (1) is a maximal α/2
separated set, and X (2) := α2
√
mB2. We apply Lemma 3.3, using a local projection mechanism as
the basic algorithm A(1), and the trivial mechanism that always outputs 0 as the algorithm A(2).
Theorem 5.1 bounds the error of this protocol in terms of g(X (1)), and Lemma 4.1 translates this
to a bound in terms of covering numbers of X as in the theorem statement. The total error of the
composed mechanism is bounded as
err2(X ,A1, n) ≤
(
(log α−1)2 sup
{
t2 · log(P(X , t))}
ε2n
)1/4
+
α
2
,
therefore if we pick n as in (5), we have err2(X ,A1, n) ≤ α as desired.
For the construction of the chaining algorithm A2 we use instead the decomposition of the set
X guaranteed by Lemma 4.2. We apply Lemma 3.3 using a local projection mechanism as the basic
algorithms A(1), . . .A(k) instead of the projection mechanism as it was the case in Theorem 1.3 —
the dependence of the error of the local projection mechanism on the sample size is quadratically
worse, which yields quadratic loss in the sample complexity of the final chaining mechanism, and
we lose an additional log(1/α) term because of the weaker composition theorem for pure differential
privacy.
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A Missing proofs
Proof of Claim 3.2. Consider the ℓ2 (semi)norm ‖ · ‖L2(ℓ2) defined on random variables Z ∈ Rm by
‖Z‖L2(ℓ2) = (E‖Z‖22)1/2. By the triangle inequality for this norm, we have
err2(X,A) = (E‖A(X)− X¯‖22)1/2
=
(
E‖A(X1) +A(X2)− X¯1 − X¯2‖22
)1/2
≤ (E‖A(X1)− X¯1‖22)1/2 + (E‖A(X1)− X¯2‖22)1/2
= err2(X1,A1) + err2(X2,A2)
Similarly, err∞ is subadditive by the triangle inequality for (semi)norm ‖Z‖L1(ℓ∞) = E‖Z‖∞
for Rm-valued random variables.
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Proof of Theorem 1.5. We apply Lemma 4.2 with the norm ‖ · ‖ = ‖ · ‖∞ and ∆ = 1 to get the
decomposition X ⊂ X (1) + . . .+X (k)+ α2Bm∞. We wish to use Lemma 3.3 with this decomposition,
to deduce the existence of the mechanism as in the theorem statement. We can use the trivial
mechanism which always outputs zero to handle the mean point problem on the universe α2B
m∞ —
such a mechanism has error bounded by α2 , and satisfies 0-zCDP. For each X (j), with 1 ≤ j ≤ k,
we will use the Multiplicative Weights Update mechanism (Lemma 2.3) instantiated with privacy
parameter ρ/k. Hence, the privacy of the composite mechanism is
∑k
j=1 ρ/k + 0 = ρ.
The total error of the mechanism guaranteed by Lemma 3.3, is bounded by
k∑
j=1
C
(
∆j(log |X (j)|)1/4(logm)1/2k1/4
ρ1/4
√
n
)
+
α
2
for some universal constant C.
We wish to pick n large enough, so that each summand above is bounded by α2k . By rearranging,
this is satisfied as soon as
n & sup
j≤k
2−2j
√
logP∞(X , 2−j)k5/2√
ρα2
.
This is equivalent, up to constant factors, to the following simpler to state condition
n & sup
t≥α/4
t2
√
logP∞(X , t)(log α−1)5/2√
ρα2
,
which completes the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Let us write W = x + W˜ for some mean zero, σ-subgaussian variable W˜ .
Note that for any given realization of W˜ , and W ∗ = argminw∈K ‖w − (x+ W˜ )‖2 as defined in the
statement of the lemma, we have ‖W ∗ − x‖22 ≤ 〈W˜ ,W ∗ − x〉 — indeed, if this were not the case,
then a point on a segment between W ∗ and x would be closer to x+ W˜ , and this point belongs to
K by convexity.
Therefore
E‖W ∗ − x‖22 ≤ E〈W˜ ,W ∗ − x〉 = E〈W˜ ,W ∗〉 − E〈W˜ , x〉 = E〈W˜ ,W ∗〉 ≤ E sup
w∈K
〈W˜ , t〉.
where the final inequality follows because W ∗ ∈ K by definition.
B Packing Lower Bounds
B.1 Lower Bounds for CDP
The starting point for the proof of Theorem 1.4 is the following theorem bounding the mutual
information between the input and the output distribution of a mechanism satisfying CDP.
Theorem B.1 ([BS16]). Let A be a mechanism satisfying ρ-zCDP, and let X be a random n-
element database. Then,
I(A(X);X) ≤ log2(e)ρn2.
Theorem B.1 and a standard packing argument give our main lemma.
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Lemma B.2. For any finite X ⊆ [0, 1]m and every α, ρ > 0, we have
sc2ρ(X , α) ≥ Ω
(
1√
ρ
·
√
log(P(X , 4α))
)
; (14)
sc∞ρ (Q, α) ≥ Ω
(
1√
ρ
·
√
log(P∞(X ), 4α)
)
. (15)
Proof. We give the argument for average error; the one for worst-case error proceeds analogously.
Take T to be a 4α-separated subset of X achieving P(X , 4α). Take X to be a random database
generated by picking a uniformly random element V ∈ T , and defining X to be the database
consisting of n copies of V . If A is such that err2(Q,A, n) ≤ α, then for any X, by Markov’s
inequality we have that, with probability at least 3/4, ‖A(X)− X¯‖2 ≤ 2α
√
m. Let Y be the closest
point in T to A(X) in Euclidean norm. Since any two elements x, x′ of T satisfy ‖x−x′‖2 > 4α
√
m,
we have that, with probability at least 3/4, Y = V . Then, by Fano’s inequality,
I(A(X);X) > 3
4
log2(|T | − 1)− 1.
The lower bound now follows from Theorem B.1.
Theorem 1.4 is a direct consequence of Lemma B.2 and the following well-known inequality,
which follows by a padding argument (see [BUV14]):
∀t ≥ α : sc2ρ(X , t) ≤ ⌈α/t⌉ · sc2ρ(X , t);
sc∞ρ (X , t) ≤ ⌈α/t⌉ · sc∞ρ (X , t).
B.2 Lower Bound for Local Protocols
We prove Theorem 1.7, which shows that the sample complexity of the Local Chaining Mechanism
is optimal up to a O(α−2) factor for any X , where optimality is defined over all sequentially
interactive protocols satisfying approximate LDP. The proof of this lower bound follows via the
framework of Bassily and Smith [BS15], which extends the arguments in [DJW18] to approximate
differential privacy. Theorem 1.7 will follow from Fano’s inequality and the following lemma.
Lemma B.3. Let 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, and let T be a finite subset of X . For any x ∈ T let us define the
distribution P βx = β1x + (1 − β)U , where 1x is the point distribution supported on x, and U is
the uniform distribution on T . Let V be a uniformly random sample from T , and let the elements
x1, . . . , xn of the database X be sampled independently from P
β
V . Then, for any protocol Π satisfying
(ε, δ)-LDP,
I(Π(X);V ) = O
(
β2ε2n+
δ
ε
n log |T |+ δ
ε
n log(ε/δ)
)
.
Lemma B.3 extends Theorem 1 from [DJW18] to approximate LDP. It is also a (straightforward)
extension of the lower bound in [BS15] to sequentially interactive mechanisms.
Before we prove Lemma B.3, let us show how it implies Theorem 1.7.
Proof of Theorem 1.7. Take T to be be a t-separated subset of of X of size P(X , t), for some t ≥ 6α.
Let β = 6α/t. Observe that for any x, x′ ∈ T , and databases X with rows x′1, . . . , x′n sampled IID
from P βx , and X ′ with rows x1, . . . , xn sampled IID from P
β
x′ we have
1√
m
‖EX¯ − EX¯ ′‖2 ≥ βt = 6α.
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Moreover, by a standard symmetrization argument (see, e.g. Chapter 6 of [LT91]),
E
1
m
∥∥X¯ − EX¯∥∥2
2
≤ 4
mn2
E
n∑
i=1
‖xi‖22 ≤
4
n
,
where in the last inequality we used the fact that xi ∈ X ⊆ [0, 1]m with probability 1. An analogous
inequality holds for X ′. By Markov’s inequality, as long as n ≥ 32α2 , with probability at least 34 both
X¯ and X¯ ′ are at distance at most α from their expected values, and therefore, we have
1√
m
‖X¯ − X¯ ′‖2 ≥ 4α.
Let us assume that Π is a protocol with error err2(X ,Π, n) ≤ α for some n ≥ 32α2 . The inequality
above implies that the output of Π on a database X with n rows sampled independently from P βx
for some x ∈ T allows us to identify x with probability at least 12 . Let V be sampled uniformly
from T and let the n-element database X be sampled IID from P βV . By Fano’s inequality, we have
that
I(Π(X);V ) ≥ 1
2
log(|T | − 1)− 1 = Ω(logP(X , t)).
Plugging in the upper bound on I(Π(X);V ) from Lemma B.3 and solving for n finishes the proof.
Towards proving Lemma B.3, we recall two lemmas from [BS15].
Lemma B.4 (Claim 5.4 of [BS15]). Let Z be a random variable over some finite set T , and let A
be an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm defined on one-element databases from T . Then,
I(A(Z);Z) = O
(
ε2 +
δ
ε
log |T |+ δ
ε
log(ε/δ)
)
Note that above A being differentially private simply means that for any two x, x′ ∈ T , it should
hold that Dδ∞(A(x)‖A(x′)) ≤ ε.
We need one final lemma which allows us to get the correct dependence on α in Lemma B.3.
Lemma B.5 (Claim 5.5 of [BS15]). Let Π be a protocol taking databases in X n and satisfying
(ε, δ)-LDP. Define a protocol Π′ over databases in T n such that the algorithm Π′i run by party i on
private input x′i and message Yi−1 received from party i− 1 is given by:
1. Sample xi from P
α
x′
i
;
2. Run Πi−1(xi, Yi−1).
Then Π′ satisfies (O(αε), O(αδ))-LDP.
Proof of Lemma B.3. Observe first that running protocol Π on X is equivalent to running the
protocol Π′ defined in Lemma B.5 on the random database consisting of n copies of V . Therefore,
I(Π;V ) = I(Π′;V ) = I(Π′1, . . . ,Π
′
n;V ),
where we use Π, Π′, Π′i as shorthands for Π(X), Π(V, . . . , V ), and Π
′
i(V, Yi−1), respectively, and
Yi−1 is the message received by party i from party i − 1, defined to be empty for i = 1. By the
chain rule of mutual information,
I(Π′;V ) = I(Π′1;V ) + I(Π
′
2;V | Π′1) + . . .+ I(Π′n;V | Π′1, . . . ,Π′n−1).
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By Definition 2.6 and Lemma B.5, conditional on Π′1 = (y1, z1), . . .Π
′
i−1 = (yi−1, zy−1) for any possi-
ble views y1, . . . , yi−1 and z1, . . . , zi−1, the algorithm Π′(·, yi−1) satisfies (O(αε), O(αδ))-differential
privacy. Then by Lemma B.4,
I(Π′i;V | Π′1 = (y1, z1), . . .Π′i−1 = (yi−1, zy−1)) = I(Π′i(V, yi−1);V ) = O
(
α2ε2 +
δ
ε
log |T |+ δ
ε
log(ε/δ)
)
.
Taking expectation over Π′1, . . .Π
′
i−1 and summing up over i, we get
I(Π;V ) = I(Π′;V ) = O
(
α2ε2n+
δ
ε
n log |T |+ δ
ε
n log(ε/δ)
)
.
This finishes the proof of the lemma.
C Basic facts about subgaussian random variables
The following lemma characterizes subgaussian random variables in terms of their moments. See
Chapter 2 of [BLM13] for a proof.
Lemma C.1. There exist universal constants C1, C2 such that
• If W is a mean zero, σ-subgaussian random variable, then for every even p, and every z ∈ Rm
we have ‖〈W, z〉‖p ≤ C1σ√p‖z‖.
• If for every even p and every z ∈ Rm, we have ‖〈W, z〉‖p ≤ C2σ√p‖z‖, then W is σ-
subgaussian.
The following lemma bounds the parameter of the sum of independent subgaussian random
variables. Once again, the proof can be found in Chapter 2 of [BLM13].
Lemma C.2. If W1,W2, . . .Wk are σi-subgaussian independent random variables, then
∑
i≤kWi
is
√
σ21 + . . . + σ
2
k-subgaussian.
The following deep fact is a consequences of Talagrand’s majorizing measures theorem [Tal87]
(see also the book [Tal14]).
Lemma C.3. For a σ-subgaussian random variable W ∈ Rm, and an arbitrary compact set K ⊂
R
m, we have E supk∈K〈W,k〉 . σg(K).
Finally we prove the following simple fact.
Fact C.4. Consider a pair of random variables (Z,S) such that Z ∈ Rm is mean zero, σ-subgaussian
random variable, and S ∈ {±1}, not necessarily independent from Z. Then SZ is O(σ) subgaussian.
Proof. By Lemma C.1 it is enough to check that for any even p and any v ∈ Rm, we have
‖〈SZ, v〉‖p . σ√p. But we have ‖〈SZ, v〉‖p = ‖|S| · 〈Z,w〉‖p = ‖〈Z,w〉‖p ≤ σ√p.
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